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FUNCTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE SEARCH FOR 
VALUE-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAWMAKING 
FRANCESCO PARISI* AND JONATHAN KLICK** 
INTRODUCTION 
During its relatively short history, the law and economics move-
ment has developed three distinct schools of thought. The first two 
schools of thought—the positive school and the normative school—
developed almost concurrently. The positive school, historically asso-
ciated with the early contributions of the Chicago school, restricts 
itself to the descriptive study of the incentives produced by the legal 
system largely because its adherents believe that efficient legal rules 
evolve naturally. On the other hand, the normative school, histori-
cally associated with the early contributions of the Yale school, sees 
the law as a tool for remedying “failures” that arise in the market. 
The subsequently developed functional school of law and eco-
nomics draws from public choice theory and the constitutional para-
digm of the Virginia school of economics, and offers a third 
perspective which is neither fully positive nor fully normative. Recog-
nizing that there are structural forces that often impede the develop-
ment of efficient legal rules, the functional school allows for the 
possibility of using insights from public choice economics to remedy 
faulty legal rules at a meta-level. However, unlike the normative 
school, the functional school also recognizes that there are failures in 
the political market that make it unlikely that changes will be made 
on a principled basis. Also, because it is difficult to identify all of the 
ultimate consequences of corrective legal rules, the functional school 
focuses on using economic theory to design legal meta-rules that lead 
to efficiency ex ante. Achieving this ex ante efficiency requires the 
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design of legal institutions that induce individuals to internalize the 
effects of their private activities, as well as to reveal their true prefer-
ences in situations where collective decisions must be made. 
In addition to these overarching differences about the role of law 
and economics in the design of legal institutions, there are other 
methodological differences among these schools of thought. These 
differences are illustrated by the debate on how to define efficiency 
on the individual decision-making level and in the aggregate. Specifi-
cally, the schools often take different stands on how social prefer-
ences should be evaluated and what exactly should be maximized to 
achieve an optimal legal system. In the sections that follow, we lay out 
the development of these schools of thought, detailing where they 
differ methodologically. 
I. COMMON TOOLS, DIFFERENT METHODS 
Most practitioners of law and economics believe that there is an 
important common ground unifying all scholars in the discipline, re-
gardless of their ideology—a search for new insights in the law by 
applying economic concepts and theories.1 Despite this common 
statement of purpose, various schools of law and economics can be 
identified, each with an elaborate research program and a distinct 
methodological approach. 
A. Positive Versus Normative Approaches to Law and Economics 
During the early period of the discipline, law and economics 
scholarship was labeled as Chicago-style or Yale-style.2 These labels 
made reference to the respective dominant positive or normative ap-
proach utilized by each school.3 The origins of the Chicago and Yale 
 
 1. See Ejan Mackaay, History of Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 2. The institution-based distinction is no longer salient as Yale has many positivist law and 
economics scholars on its faculty, just as Chicago has scholars who can be categorized in the 
normative school. For a more extensive discussion of functional law and economics and its role 
within the landscape of analytical methods in law and economics, see Francesco Parisi, The Law 
and Economics Movement, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 341, 341–42 (Charles 
K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004); Francesco Parisi, Functional Law and Economics, 
in NORMS AND VALUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Aristides N. Hatzis ed., forthcoming). 
 3. Parisi, The Law and Economics Movement, supra note 2, at 341 (“[D]espite [some] 
notable antecedents, it was not until the mid-twentieth century through the work of Henry 
Simon, Aaron Director, Henry Manne, George Stigler, Armen Alchian, Gordon Tullock, and 
others that the links between law and economics became an object of serious academic pur-
suit.”). 
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schools of law and economics are attributable to the early work of a 
handful of scholars, including the pioneering work of Ronald Coase 
and Guido Calabresi in the early 1960s. 
A difference in approach is detectable between the law and eco-
nomics contributions of the early 1960s and those that followed in 
the 1970s. While the earlier studies appraise the effects of legal 
rules on the normal functioning of the economic system . . . , the 
subsequent generation of studies utilizes economic analysis to 
achieve a better understanding of the legal system. Indeed, in the 
1970s a number of important applications of economics to law 
gradually exposed the economic structure of basically every aspect 
of a legal system: from its origin and evolution to its substantive, 
procedural, and constitutional rules.4 
In many respects, the impact of law and economics has exceeded its 
planned ambitions. One effect of the incorporation of economics 
into the study of law was to irreversibly transform traditional legal 
methodology. Legal rules began to be studied as a working sys-
tem. . . . Economics provided the analytical rigor necessary for the 
study of the vast body of legal rules present in a modern legal sys-
tem. This intellectual revolution came at an appropriate time, when 
legal academia was actively searching for a tool that permitted criti-
cal appraisal of the law, rather than merely strengthening the dog-
matic consistencies of the system.5 
At this point, methodological differences came to surface with 
substantive practical differences. The Chicago school laid most of its 
foundations on the work carried out by Richard Posner in the 1970s. 
An important premise of the Chicago approach to law and economics 
is the idea that the common law is the result of an effort, conscious or 
not, to induce efficient outcomes. This premise is known as the effi-
ciency of the common law hypothesis. According to this hypothesis 
(first intimated by Coase,6 and later systematized and greatly ex-
tended by Posner), common law rules attempt to allocate resources in 
either a Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient manner.7 
Posner endorses a scientific approach, which uses economics to 
objectively study the legal system and the behavior it regulates. He 
believes that positive economic analysis is immune to most abuse and 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 7. Further, common law rules are said to enjoy a comparative advantage over legislation 
in fulfilling this task because of the evolutionary selection of common law rules through adjudi-
cation. Several important contributions provide the foundations for this claim; the scholars who 
have advanced theories in support of the hypothesis are, however, often in disagreement as to 
its conceptual basis. 
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misuse because it is merely used to explain or predict incentives 
which guide individuals and institutions under alternative legal rules. 
The primary hypothesis advanced by positive economic analysis 
of law is the notion that efficiency is the predominant factor shaping 
the rules, procedures, and institutions of the common law. Posner 
contends that efficiency is a defensible criterion in the context of judi-
cial decision-making because “justice” considerations, on the content 
of which there is no academic or political consensus, introduce unac-
ceptable ambiguity into the judicial process. In arguing for positive 
use of economics, Posner is not denying the existence of valuable 
normative law and economics applications. In fact, law and economics 
often has many objective things to say that will affect one’s normative 
analysis of a policy.8 
Despite the powerful analytical reach of economic analysis, 
Chicago scholars acknowledged from the outset that the economist’s 
competence in the evaluation of legal issues is limited. While the 
economist’s perspective can prove crucial for the positive analysis of 
the efficiency of alternative legal rules and the study of the effects of 
alternative rules on the distribution of wealth and income, Chicago-
style economists generally recognized the limits of their role in 
providing normative prescriptions for social change or legal reform.9 
Conversely, the Yale school of law and economics, often de-
scribed as the “normative” school believes that there is a larger need 
for legal intervention in order to correct for pervasive forms of mar-
 
 8. Posner offers crime as an example. Positive law and economics can help explain and 
predict how various punishments will affect the behavior of criminals. It might determine that a 
certain sanction is more likely to deter a certain crime. While this analysis does not by itself 
mean that the law should be adopted, it can be used to influence normative analysis on whether 
the law would be beneficial to society. 
 9. Recognition of the positive nature of the economic analysis of law was not sufficient to 
dispel the many misunderstandings and controversies in legal academia engendered by the law 
and economics movement’s methodological revolution. As Coase indicated, the cohesiveness of 
economic techniques makes it possible for economics to move successfully into another field, 
such as law, and dominate it intellectually. See Coase, supra note 6. But methodological differ-
ences played an important part in the uneasy marriage between law and economics. The Pop-
perian methodology of positive science was in many respects at odds with the existing paradigms 
of legal analysis. Rowley characterizes such differences, observing that positive economists 
follow the Popperian approach, whereby testable hypotheses (or models) are derived by means 
of logical deduction, and then tested empirically. See Charles K. Rowley, Social Sciences and 
Law: The Relevance of Economic Theories, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 391–94 (1981). 
Anglo-American legal analysis, on the other hand, is generally inductive: lawyers use individual 
judgments to construct a general premise of law. Much work has been done in law and econom-
ics despite these methodological differences, with a reciprocal enrichment of the analytical tools 
of both disciplines. Id. at 394. 
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ket failure.10 Distributional concerns are central to the Yale-style lit-
erature. The overall philosophy of this group is often presented as 
more value-tainted and more prone to policy intervention than the 
Chicago law and economics school. 
Unlike its Chicago counterpart, this school has attracted liberal 
practitioners who employ the methodology of the Chicago school but 
push it to formulate normative propositions on what the law ought to 
be like.11 Given the overriding need to pursue justice and fairness in 
distribution through the legal system, most Yale-style scholars would 
suggest that efficiency, as defined by the Chicago school, could never 
be the ultimate end of a legal system. 
B. The Functional Approach and Individual-Centered Economic 
Analysis 
As the domain of law and economics has expanded, its perspec-
tive on methodological issues has not been stagnant.12 In the 1990s, a 
new generation of literature, developed at the intersection of law, 
economics, and public choice theory, pushed the boundaries of eco-
nomic analysis of law, studying the origins and formative mechanisms 
of legal rules. The resulting approach, which we describe as the “func-
tional” approach to legal analysis, is quite skeptical of both the nor-
mative and the positive alternatives.13 The systematic incorporation of 
 
 10. Mackaay observes that the Yale school considers market failures to be more pervasive 
than Chicago scholars are willing to admit. See Mackaay, supra note 1, at 89–91. Legal interven-
tion is believed to be the appropriate way of correcting such failures, although it may not suc-
ceed in all circumstances. Id. 
 11. Posner acknowledges that normative economic analysis, i.e., the use of economics to 
argue for what law should be, is susceptible to criticism. On the other hand, he notes that while 
economic analysis assesses the costs and benefits of a proposed rule, it is the non-economic 
weighting of the economic factors which is vulnerable to subjective ideology. See Richard A. 
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 286–87 (1979). 
 12. Some degree of controversy still surrounds several of the methodological, normative, 
and philosophical underpinnings of the economic approach to law; although most of the ideo-
logical differences tend to lose significance because their operational paradigms often lead to 
analogous results when applied to real cases. However, some scholars perceive that the current 
state of law and economics is comparable to the state of economics prior to the advent of public 
choice theory, insofar as an understanding of “political failures” was missing from the study of 
market failures. See James M. Buchanan, Good Economics—Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 
(1974); Charles K. Rowley, The Common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and 
Institutional Critique, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 355 (1989). Public choice may indeed inject a skepti-
cal, and at times disruptive, perspective into the more elegant and simple framework of neoclas-
sical economics, but this added element may well be necessary to understand a complex reality. 
 13. For a brief intellectual history of the three approaches to law and economics, see Rich-
ard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi, Scuole e Tendenze nell’Analisi Economica del Diritto, 147 
BIBLIOTECA DELLA LIBERTÀ 3 (1998). 
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public choice theory into the economic approach to law may serve to 
bridge the gap between conflicting normative perspectives in law and 
economics, at least by bringing the debate onto the more solid ground 
of collective choice theory. 
The functional approach is wary of the generalized efficiency hy-
pothesis espoused by the positive school.14 In this respect, functional-
ists share some of this skepticism of the normative school. There is 
little empirical support for a generalized trust in the efficiency of the 
law in all substantive areas. The functional school of law and econom-
ics is even more vocally skeptical of a general efficiency hypothesis 
when applied to sources of the law other than common law (e.g., 
legislation or administrative regulations). 
The functional approach also is critical of the normative exten-
sions and ad hoc corrective policies which are often advocated by the 
normative schools. Economic models are a simplified depiction of 
reality. Thus, functionalists think it is generally dangerous to use such 
tools to design corrective or interventionist policies. In this respect, 
functionalists are aligned with the positive school in their criticism of 
the normative approach. According to both positivists and functional-
ists, normative economic analysis often risks overlooking the many 
unintended consequences of legal intervention. 
Public choice theory in general, and constitutional political econ-
omy in particular, provides strong methodological foundations for the 
functional school of law and economics. The findings of public choice 
theory, while supporting much of the traditional wisdom, pose several 
challenges to neoclassical law and economics. In spite of the sophisti-
cated mathematical techniques of economic analysis, judges and poli-
cymakers in many situations still lack the expertise and methods for 
evaluating the efficiency of alternative legal rules.15 Therefore, courts 
 
 14. See GORDON TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971) for an early systematic treat-
ment of the law from the functionalist perspective. In this work, Tullock raises a good deal of 
skepticism regarding the efficiency of prevailing legal systems, pleading in the book’s preface 
that “[o]ur present legal system cries out for reform.” Id. at vi. 
 15. An important premise of the functional approach to law and economics is its reliance 
on methodological individualism. According to this paradigm of analysis, only individuals 
choose and act. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, 1 
CONST. POL. ECON. 1 (1990). The functional approach to law and economics is informed by an 
explicit recognition that whatever social reality we seek to explain at the aggregate level, it 
ought to be understood as the result of the choices and actions of individual human beings who 
pursue their goals with an independently formed understanding of the reality that surrounds 
them. See VIKTOR J. VANBERG, RULES AND CHOICE IN ECONOMICS 1 (1994). Normative 
individualism further postulates that only the judgment of single individuals can provide a 
relevant benchmark against which the merits of alternative rules can be evaluated. Id. 
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and policymakers should undertake a functional analysis. Such an 
analysis requires them to first inquire into the incentives underlying 
the legal or social structure that generated the legal rule, rather than 
directly attempting to weigh the costs and benefits of individual 
rules.16 In this way, the functionalist approach to law and economics 
can extend the domain of traditional law and economics inquiry to 
include both the study of the influence of market and non-market 
institutions (other than politics) on legal regimes, and the study of the 
comparative advantages of alternative sources of centralized or de-
centralized lawmaking in supplying efficient rules. 
With this focus on the underlying legal and social structure, there 
is less impetus to micro-manage individual legal and policy decisions. 
Such micro-management is likely to suffer from the rent seeking ac-
tivities of interested parties. Much of the intellectual foundation for 
this structural focus can be found in the seminal writings of James 
Buchanan.17 Buchanan eloquently describes the constitutional politi-
cal economy research program in his Nobel Prize address by saying “I 
sought to make economic sense out of the relationship between the 
individual and the state before proceeding to advance policy nos-
trums.”18 
II. INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES, COLLECTIVE CHOICES: PARETO, 
BENTHAM, AND RAWLS 
The need to make comparative evaluations between different 
rules motivates much of law and economics. Consequently, the sec-
ond methodological problem in law and economics deals with the 
choice of criteria for carrying out such comparative analysis. In prac-
tical terms, this problem is concerned with the method of aggregation 
of individual preferences into social preferences, and is not unique to 
law and economics. It is part of a much larger methodological debate 
in economic philosophy and welfare economics. 
As early as 1881, F.Y. Edgeworth stated the moral dilemma of 
social welfare analysis, observing that a moral calculus should pro-
 
 16. On this point, see Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Mer-
chant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994) (introducing the 
similar idea of structural adjudication of norms). 
 17. A good summary of Buchanan’s structural vision of government and society can be 
found in GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional 
Political Economy, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 3–19 (2000). 
 18. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 243, 
243 (1987). 
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ceed with a comparative evaluation of “the happiness of one person 
with the happiness of another . . . . Such comparison can no longer be 
shirked, if there is to be any systematic morality at all.”19 The problem 
obviously arises from the fact that economists do not have any reli-
able method for measuring individuals’ utility, let alone making inter-
personal comparisons of utility. 
Economic analysis generally utilizes one of the three fundamen-
tal criteria of preference aggregation. 
A. Ordinality and Pareto 
The first criterion of social welfare is largely attributable to Ital-
ian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto. The Pareto criterion 
limits the inquiry to ordinal preferences of the relevant individuals. 
According to Pareto, an optimal allocation is one that maximizes the 
well-being of one individual relative to the well-being of other indi-
viduals being constant.20 In normal situations, there are several possi-
ble solutions that would qualify for such a criterion of social 
optimality. For example, if the social problem is one of distributing a 
benefit between two parties, any hypothetical distribution would be 
Pareto optimal, since there is no possible alternative redistribution 
that would make one party better off without harming another party. 
The Pareto criterion has been criticized for two main reasons: (a) 
it is status quo dependent, in that different results are achieved de-
pending on the choice of the initial allocation; and (b) it only allows 
ordinal evaluation of preferences, since it does not contain any 
mechanism to induce parties or decision makers to reveal or evaluate 
cardinal preferences (i.e., the intensity of preferences). As a result of 
these shortcomings, scholars have questioned the usefulness of the 
Pareto criterion in its applications to law and economics.21 
B. Utilitarian Measures: Bentham and Kaldor-Hicks 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, economists and 
philosophers developed welfare paradigms according to what degree 
 
 19. FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS 7–8 (Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1967) (1881). 
 20. As a corollary, a change to a Pareto superior alternative makes someone better off 
without making anyone worse off. 
 21. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1211 (1991). 
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all affected individuals had to be taken into account in any compara-
tive evaluation of different states of the world. This methodological 
trend, related to utilitarian philosophy, is best represented by phi-
losophers and jurists such as Bentham and later economists such as 
Kaldor and Hicks, who in different ways formulated criteria of social 
welfare that accounted for the cardinal preferences of individuals.22 
In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,23 
Bentham presents his theory of value and motivation. He suggests 
that mankind is governed by two masters: ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure.’ The 
two provide the fundamental motivation for human action. Bentham 
notes that not all individuals derive pleasure from the same objects or 
activities, and not all human sensibilities are the same.24 Bentham’s 
moral imperative, which has greatly influenced the methodological 
debate in law and economics, is that policymakers have an obligation 
to select rules that give “the greatest happiness to the greatest num-
ber.”25 As pointed out by Kelly,26 this formulation is quite problem-
atic, since it identifies two maximands (i.e., degree of pleasure and 
number of individuals) without specifying the tradeoff between one 
and the other. Bentham’s utilitarian approach is thus, at best, merely 
inspirational for policy purposes. 
Later economists, including Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovszky, for-
mulated more rigorous welfare paradigms, which avoided the theo-
retical ambiguities of Bentham’s proposition.27 However, these 
formulations presented a different set of difficulties in their imple-
mentation. The core idea of their approach is that state A is to be 
preferred to state B if those who gain from the move to A gain 
 
 22. See 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 31 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1839); J. R. Hicks, The Foundations 
of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Eco-
nomics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 23. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Wilfrid Harrison ed., Oxford 1948) (1823) [here-
inafter BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION]. 
 24. For an interesting discussion on Bentham and his influence on the law and economics 
movement, see Richard A. Posner, Bentham’s Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, 
51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425 (1998). 
 25. See BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 23, at 128 n.1; 
see also 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 221, 227 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1776) (“It is the greatest happi-
ness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong. . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 26. See Paul Kelly, Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832), in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 156, 158 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 27. See Kaldor, supra note 22; Hicks, supra note 22; Tibor Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare 
Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941). 
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enough to compensate those who lose. The test is generally known as 
the Kaldor-Hicks test of potential compensation. It is one of “poten-
tial” compensation because the compensation of the losers is only 
hypothetical and does not actually need to take place.28 In practical 
terms, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion requires a comparison of the gains 
of one group and the losses of the other group. As long as the gainers 
gain more than the losers lose, the move is deemed efficient. Mathe-
matically, both the Bentham and the Kaldor-Hicks versions of effi-
ciency are carried out by comparing the aggregate payoffs of the 
various alternatives and selecting the option that maximizes such 
summation. 
C. Multiplicative Social Preferences: Nash and Rawls 
Other paradigms of social welfare depart from the straight utili-
tarian approach, suggesting that social welfare maximization requires 
something more than the maximization of total payoffs for the vari-
ous members of society. Societies are formed by a network of indi-
vidual relations and there are some important interpersonal effects 
that are part of individual utility functions. Additionally, human na-
ture is characterized by diminishing marginal utility, which gives rele-
vance to the distribution of benefits across members of the group. 
Imagine two hypothetical regimes: (a) in which all members of 
society eat a meal a day; and (b) in which only a random one-half of 
the population gets to eat a double meal while the other unlucky half 
remains starving. From a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, the two alterna-
tives are not distinguishable from the point of view of efficiency be-
cause the total amount of food available remains unchanged. In a 
Kaldor-Hicks test, those who get a double meal have just enough to 
compensate the others and thus society should remain indifferent 
between the two allocational systems. Obviously, this indifference 
proposition would leave most observers unsatisfied. In the absence of 
actual compensation, the criterion fails to consider the diminishing 
marginal benefit of a second meal and the increasing marginal pain of 
starvation. Likewise, the randomized distribution of meals fails to 
consider the interpersonal effects of unfair allocations. Fortunate 
individuals suffer a utility loss by knowing that other individuals are 
starving while they enjoy a double meal. Because of the diminishing 
 
 28. One should note that, if actual compensation were carried out, any test satisfying the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency would also satisfy the Pareto criterion. 
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marginal utility of wealth and interpersonal utility effects, from an ex 
ante point of view, no individual would choose allocation system (b), 
even though the expected return from (b) is equal to the return from 
(a). 
Scholars that try to evaluate the welfare implications of distribu-
tional inequalities generally do so by invoking Rawls’29 theories of 
justice or by using Nash’s30 framework of welfare. The intuition under-
lying these criteria of welfare is relatively straightforward; the well-
being of a society is judged according to the well-being of its weakest 
members. The use of an algebraic product to aggregate individual 
preferences captures that intuition. Like the strength of a chain is 
determined by the strength of its weakest link, so the chain of prod-
ucts in an algebraic multiplication is heavily affected by the smallest 
multipliers. Indeed, at the limit, if there is a zero in the chain of prod-
ucts, the entire grand total will collapse to zero. This means that the 
entire social welfare of a group approaches zero as the utility of one 
of its members goes to zero. 
In the law and economics tradition, these models of social wel-
fare have not enjoyed great popularity. This is not due to an ideologi-
cal preconception but rather is a result of a combination of several 
practical reasons. These reasons include the general tendency to un-
dertake a two-step optimization in the design of policies, and the dif-
 
 29. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Notable scholars have considered the 
conditions under which principles of justice can emerge spontaneously through the voluntary 
interaction and exchange of individual members of a group. As in a contractarian setting, the 
reality of customary law formation relies on a voluntary process through which members of a 
community develop rules that govern their social interaction by voluntarily adhering to emerg-
ing behavioral standards. In this setting, Harsanyi suggests that optimal social norms are those 
that would emerge through the interaction of individual actors in a social setting with imper-
sonal preferences. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interper-
sonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). 
  The impersonality requirement for individual preferences is satisfied if the decision 
makers have an equal chance of finding themselves in any one of the initial social positions and 
they rationally choose a set of rules to maximize their expected welfare. Rawls employs Har-
sanyi’s model of stochastic ignorance in his theory of justice. However, the Rawlsian “veil of 
ignorance” introduces an element of risk aversion in the choice between alternative states of the 
world, thus altering the outcome achievable under Harsanyi’s original model, with a bias toward 
equal distribution (i.e., with results that approximate the Nash criterion of social welfare). Fur-
ther analysis of the spontaneous formation of norms and principles of morality can be found in 
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 
(1977); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986). 
 30. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). According 
to the Nash criterion, social welfare is given by the product of the utility of the members of 
society. See id. at 159; see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 379–82 (rev. ed. 1989) 
(attributing the multiplicative form of the social welfare function to Nash). 
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ficulties of identifying an objective criterion for assessing interper-
sonal utility and diminishing marginal utility effects. From a methodo-
logical point of view, distributional concerns are generally kept 
separate from the pursuit of efficiency in policymaking. Such separa-
tion has been rationalized on the basis that the legal system is too 
costly an instrument for distribution, given the advantage of the tax 
system for wholesale reallocation of wealth.31 
Some of the tension among these three social welfare standards 
is dissipated by the functional school’s focus on ex ante welfare. That 
is, ideally, legal meta-rules should be designed to maximize expected 
welfare, not realized welfare. From the ex ante perspective, there is no 
tension between the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks standard.32 Further, 
while the ex ante perspective does not require the generalized risk 
aversion posited in the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” decision rule, it 
does allow for the protection of the “worst off” member of society 
along dimensions where a representative individual would rationally 
choose such protections ex ante. This notion is implicit in Buchanan 
and Tullock’s derivation of optimal constitutional rules, which serves 
as part of the foundation of functional law and economics.33 
III. WHAT IS THE MAXIMAND? 
There is a third methodological problem: What should the legal 
system try to maximize? In this debate, even strict adherents to the 
instrumentalist view of the law may question whether the objective of 
the law should be the maximization of aggregate wealth or the maxi-
mization of aggregate utility. 
If the scholars involved in this debate could look at the issue as 
neutral spectators, consensus could be reached on the idea that the 
ultimate policy goal is the maximization of human happiness and 
well-being. Consequently, the human dimension cannot be by-passed 
in policy evaluation. Regardless of such an observation, economic 
analysis of law rarely uses utility-based methods of evaluation. The 
reason for this is mostly pragmatic. Unlike wealth (or quantities of 
physical resources), utility cannot be objectively measured. Further-
more, interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, rendering 
 
 31. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
 32. For an exposition of this point, see Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, The Disunity of 
Unanimity, 14 CONST. POL. ECON. 83, 85 (2003). 
 33. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). 
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any balancing across groups or individuals largely arbitrary. These 
limitations make utility maximization unviable for practical policy 
purposes. 
Given the above limitations, practitioners of economic analysis 
of law have departed from the nineteenth century utilitarian ideal of 
utility maximization.34 Instead, they have increasingly used a paradigm 
of wealth maximization. Posner is the most notable exponent of the 
wealth maximization paradigm. Under wealth maximization princi-
ples, a transaction is desirable if it increases the sum of wealth for the 
relevant parties (where wealth is meant to include all tangible and 
intangible goods and services). 
The early years of law and economics were characterized by 
some uneasiness in accepting the notion of wealth maximization as an 
ancillary paradigm of justice. Most of the differences proved to be 
largely verbal, and many others were dispelled by the gradual accep-
tance of a distinction between paradigms of utility maximization and 
wealth maximization. However, two objections continue to affect the 
lines of the debate. 
The first objection relates to the need for specifying an initial set 
of individual entitlements or rights as a necessary prerequisite for 
operationalizing wealth maximization. In this context, one can think 
of the various criticisms of wealth maximization by property rights 
advocates who perceive the social cost of adopting such a criterion of 
adjudication as very high, given wealth maximization’s instrumentalist 
view of individual rights and entitlements. These critics argue that 
rights have value that must be accounted for outside of how useful 
they might be to the accumulation of wealth. Along similar lines, 
these critics suggest that the wealth maximization criterion of eco-
nomic analysis is comparable to the methodological approach of eco-
nomics prior to the advent of public choice theory, insofar as an 
understanding of “political failures” was missing from the study of 
collective decision making.35 
The second objection springs from the theoretical difficulty of 
defining the proper role of efficiency as an ingredient of justice, vis-à-
vis other social goals. Legal scholars within the law and economics 
 
 34. Bentham challenged the use of objective factors, such as wealth or physical resources, 
as a proxy for human happiness. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 22. Despite the difficulties in 
quantification of values such as utility or happiness, the pursuit of pleasure and happiness and 
the avoidance of pain are the motivating forces of human behavior. Wealth, food, and shelter 
are mere instruments to achieve such human goals. 
 35. See Buchanan, supra note 12; Rowley, supra note 12. 
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tradition have claimed that an increase in wealth cannot constitute 
social improvement unless it furthers some other social goal, such as 
utility or equality.36 Denying that one can trade off efficiency against 
justice, these scholars argue instead that efficiency and distribution 
are equally essential elements of justice, which is seen as a goal of a 
different order than either of its constitutive elements. 
Posner stands as the most notable defender of the criterion of 
wealth maximization addressing these important questions and justi-
fying wealth maximization as a worthy standard for evaluating legal 
rules. Posner explicitly advocates wealth maximization as a criterion 
that should guide judicial rule making.37 Making the case for wealth 
maximization, he defines it and compares it with the alternative theo-
ries of utilitarianism and libertarianism. As mentioned earlier, wealth 
maximization occurs when a transaction increases the total amount of 
goods and services, weighted by offer prices and demands prices.38 
Because of the market’s ability to capture subjective values and pref-
erences, wealth maximization is a comprehensive measure of social 
welfare.39 
A. Wealth Maximization as a Social Value 
Much of the criticism of law and economics lies in the mistaken 
belief that wealth maximization is a form of utilitarianism. Prior to his 
important article on utilitarianism and legal theory,40 Posner himself 
had been wrongly characterized as acknowledging utilitarianism as 
the inspiration of law and economics. Posner distinguishes utilitarian-
ism from the methodological premises of law and economics, arguing 
 
 36. See Guido Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980). 
 37. See Richard A. Posner, The Justice of Economics, 1 ECONOMIA DELLE SCELTE 
PUBBLICHE 15 (1987). 
 38. For intangible goods for which there are no explicit markets, Posner suggests that 
shadow prices serve equally well as tools of objective evaluation. 
 39. In a methodological comparison of the various criteria of social choice, Posner consid-
ers the value of wealth maximization as a criterion for guiding judicial rule making and adjudi-
cation. See Posner, supra note 37. Even if no moral or ethical argument can be established in its 
favor, Posner concludes wealth maximization or efficiency is still a valuable tool for normative 
analysis. Id. Posner further points out that economics can, with a morally-neutral approach, 
provide an evaluation of the costs of any proposed action. He contends economics can provide 
direction to any decision, particularly one in which efficiency is a prevailing value. See Richard 
A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1990); Richard A. Posner, 
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). 
 40. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 39. 
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in favor of wealth maximization as a superior normative theory of 
law. 
According to Posner, utilitarianism holds that the worth of a law 
should be judged by its effect in promoting the surplus of pleasure 
over pain (“happiness”) across society. Normative economics holds 
that a law should be judged by its effectiveness in promoting social 
welfare, a term which when broadly defined almost means the same 
as utilitarian happiness. In this context, Posner suggests that econo-
mists’ use of “utility” as a synonym for “welfare” adds to the confu-
sion. 
Utilitarianism is distinct from wealth maximization because it 
seeks to maximize aggregate “happiness” while wealth maximization 
seeks to maximize aggregate economic utility, called “wealth.” While 
happiness is a philosophical concept that cannot be easily measured, 
wealth is more practical and measurable. More fundamentally, happi-
ness is an insufficient social goal because happiness is passive and 
focuses on consumption. Wealth maximization, on the other hand, is 
dependent on productive effort. While being aware of the limits of a 
concept of wealth as a good in itself, Posner believes that wealth 
maximization results in a work ethic that is in fact necessary for utili-
tarian happiness to be brought about, and thus is an important 
mechanism for the advancement of society. While not precluding an 
instrumentalist maximization of wealth, Posner’s theory does not rely 
on utilitarianism as a necessary methodological assumption.41 
There is a possible intuitive justification of wealth maximization. 
This intuitive foundation was first emphasized by Posner, who argued 
that wealth maximization can be regarded as a superior ethical prin-
ciple because it is more consistent with ethical intuitions, provides for 
a more sound theory of justice, and yields more definite results than 
the alternative economic views on justice.42 By promoting the efficient 
 
 41. In order to evaluate the ethical argument for efficiency rather than utilitarianism, 
Posner acts on the presumption that any ethical theory is valid unless rejected, and he evaluates 
both utilitarianism and wealth maximization on two principal grounds for rejecting an ethical 
theory: its logical inadequacy, or its incongruence with widely shared ethical intuitions. Posner 
regards utilitarianism as somewhat illogical and inconsistent with generally accepted notions of 
individual rights. Its logical and moral shortcoming rests in its boundless insistence that we 
maximize the total amount of happiness in the universe, even beyond human utility, which can 
only be attained by making many people unhappy. In this way, Posner attacks traditional utili-
tarianism for its indefiniteness. See id. 
 42. See id. 
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use of resources, wealth maximization encourages traditional capaci-
ties, such as intelligence, and traditional virtues, such as honesty.43 
An important part of the debate on the paradigm of wealth 
maximization relates to its ethical and normative justification. This 
foundational work in law and economics has been described as a form 
of normative analysis that “turns the mirror of analysis inward” at-
tempting to answer the fundamental question of “why the law or pub-
lic policy should promote efficiency.”44 Advocates of wealth 
maximization generally offer two basic arguments in support of such a 
normative goal: a teleological justification and a consent justifica-
tion.45 These justifications have come under the scrutiny of well-
known legal and economic theorists. 
According to Coleman, wealth maximization is a form of Kaldor-
Hicks maximization in disguise.46 The practical advantages of wealth-
maximization over utility-maximization relate to the fact that it is 
easier to ascertain actual changes in wealth as opposed to utility. In 
spite of such practical superiority, Posner’s normative criterion re-
mains subject to several of the shortcomings of the Kaldor-Hicks cri-
terion, including its difficult moral defensibility. Posner’s defense of 
wealth maximization has been further criticized for building upon 
notions of implied, rather than actual, consent. Coleman recognizes 
the usefulness of tests of hypothetical consent a-là-Rawls, but ques-
tions the uniqueness of wealth maximization as a dominant criterion 
of justice from the perspective of ex ante social choice. The indeter-
minacy of such a hypothetical social choice poses a challenge to the 
consent-based moral justification of wealth maximization. 
 
 43. Posner suggests that wealth-maximization also supports the creation of a system of 
exclusive rights that extends to all valued things that are scarce, with the initial right vesting in 
those who are likely to value them the most and a free market for those rights once assigned 
(resembling Adam Smith’s system of “natural liberty”). See id. Such a system relies on tradi-
tional capacities and virtues to reduce the cost of transacting those rights. Further, wealth 
maximization requires legal rules to promote hypothetical bargains where transaction costs are 
prohibitive. It also requires legal remedies to deter and redress the invasion of rights. Thus, a 
market economy regulated according to wealth-maximizing principles fosters empathy and 
benevolence without destroying individuality. 
 44. Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Rich-
ard Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1982). 
 45. Libertarianism challenges the wholesale endorsement of wealth-maximization because 
of the libertarian interest in personal autonomy over social welfare and its opposition to coer-
cive exchanges, be them explicit or under disguise. Posner notes that when compensation is 
considered ex ante, much coercive exchange is essentially voluntary, thus satisfying libertarian 
concerns. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 39, at 130–31. 
 46. See generally Coleman, supra note 44. 
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B. Economic Theories of Justice 
In spite of the articulate defense of the criterion of efficiency in 
legal and policy decisions, most law and economic scholars do not 
argue that efficiency concerns should replace morality. However, 
whenever moral or ethical theories of justice fail to generate unambi-
guous results that could guide policy choices and, more generally, in 
the absence of thumping moral or ethical concerns efficiency provides 
the most appropriate criterion for allocating limited resources among 
competing claims. 
Legal scholars such as Robin Malloy, however, have often ar-
gued that efficiency-based and utilitarian theories of justice promote 
disrespect for individual liberty,47 are “indeterminative and elitist,”48 
and “can hardly be viewed as anything other than amoral if not im-
moral.”49 Posner, in his reply to Malloy, once again takes issue with 
these criticisms.50 He suggests that these critiques miss the mark, in 
that they treat the methodology of law and economics as a political 
theory.51 Indeed, while arguing that wealth maximization is the best 
normative and positive theory of common law rights and remedies, 
Posner never suggests that wealth maximization should be the only 
social value or principle of justice.52 
Even the most extreme advocates of wealth maximization do not 
contend that such a criterion should override moral concerns. The 
preference for wealth maximization over other criteria of welfare 
derives from the general suspicion against paternalistic governmental 
intervention (which would be unavoidably triggered if morality was 
recognized as the sole criterion of legal interpretation and judicial 
 
 47. Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner 
and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209, 254 (1988). 
 48. Id. at 248. 
 49. Id. at 253. 
 50. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 261 (1988). 
 51. Id. at 263. 
 52. See id. at 265 (“Wealth as I define it is an important social value, and in some settings, 
such as that of common law adjudication . . . I believe it should be the paramount value. But I 
have never suggested that it is the only social value . . . .”). In a similar context, Posner describes 
himself as a “pragmatic economic libertarian.” Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, supra note 
39, at 165. He is libertarian in that he is suspicious of public intervention and favors small gov-
ernment. Id. He uses economic theory to define what he sees as the appropriate role of the 
government to intervene and correct serious market failures. Id. at 166. He is pragmatic in the 
sense that he does not derive these free-market views from dogmatic or philosophical underpin-
nings. Id. Rather, he uses wealth maximization to operationalize his economic libertarianism. Id. 
at 167. 
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action) and the risks involved in shifting the burden on the judiciary 
in asking judges to decide controversies on the basis of distributive 
considerations. 
Wealth maximization sometimes runs contrary to moral guides 
such as natural rights. The natural rights perspective views society as 
a compact, in which people surrender just enough of their own natu-
ral liberties as is necessary to protect everyone else’s equal natural 
liberties. Posner believes that because the notion of natural rights can 
be expanded so readily, it is too unstable a foundation to build upon. 
He also believes that it is fundamentally anti-democratic because it 
holds that the more rights people have, the smaller the permissible 
scope of public policy deliberation. 
Many of the arguments made by natural rights proponents rely 
on examples for which there is moral consensus. Posner points out 
that the power of natural rights’ moral discourse runs out when one 
faces controversial moral issues. Thus, paradoxically, whenever an 
analytical perspective is most needed to frame policy questions, natu-
ral rights emerge as non-dispositive and thus hardly valuable instru-
ments of adjudication. 
C. Preference Revelation as Decision Criterion 
Functional law and economics bypasses the wealth/utility divide 
by focusing on choice or revealed preference as the criterion of deci-
sion. That is, by designing mechanisms through which parties are in-
duced to reveal their subjective preferences, the functional law and 
economics approach obviates the need for third parties, such as 
judges or legislators, to decide between wealth and utility as the ap-
propriate maximand. The institutions favored by the functional ap-
proach minimize the impediments to the full revelation of the 
subjective preferences of the parties to a transaction by focusing on 
incentive compatibility mechanisms. This mechanism design approach 
tends to align individual and social optimality. 
The mechanism design perspective of economics attempts to 
channel the intrinsic behavioral tendencies of individuals to reach a 
desired social outcome. That is, rather than attempting to alter indi-
vidual behavior, functional law and economics suggests that institu-
tions should provide incentives, such that individuals will naturally act 
in a desired way without any external monitoring or coercion. This 
necessarily requires that individuals have the ability and incentive to 
reveal their own subjective values and preferences, and that all costs 
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and benefits generated by an individual’s actions accrue to that indi-
vidual. This implies that individuals will only achieve socially optimal 
outcomes when they act for their own gain, and incentives are not 
attenuated by principal agent problems whereby an individual is di-
rected to fulfill some social goal directly. 
Examples of research in this area include the functional law and 
economics explanations for the cooperation that underlies much of 
human interaction. Cooperative behavior is an empirical regularity 
that proves puzzling from both the positive and normative perspec-
tives. Cooperation does not easily fit within either of the original law 
and economics perspectives. Unbridled competition is what drives the 
supposedly efficient outcomes predicted by the positive school, while 
the normative school prescribes external limits or alterations on the 
natural competition that arises among individuals. However, Fon and 
Parisi show how social norms evolve to solve various prisoner’s di-
lemma games by internalizing reciprocity constraints on individual 
action, improving the welfare of participants relative to the purely 
competitive outcome.53 Laboratory evidence of the internalization of 
these reciprocity norms is provided by McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith.54 
This individual-centered focus also solves another seemingly intracta-
ble problem encountered in a corporate approach to law. Utility 
maximization necessarily requires that subjective values be attributed 
to human action. However, it is not possible for an outside observer 
to evaluate these subjective values and draw the appropriate legal or 
policy conclusions to maximize social welfare. To avoid this informa-
tion problem, the functional law and economics approach relies on 
institutions that provide individuals with the opportunity to express 
their own values truthfully. These revealed preferences are then 
granted complete validity in normative terms, with law and policy 
makers taking them as a given. 
CONCLUSION 
Functional law and economics avoids paternalism and methodo-
logical imperialism by formulating value-neutral principles of collec-
tive choice. It builds upon the methodological premises of normative 
individualism, giving greatest freedom to individual choice, and fos-
 
 53. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation, 159 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 76 (2003). 
 54. See Kevin A. McCabe, Mary L. Rigdon, & Vernon L. Smith, Positive Reciprocity and 
Intentions in Trust Games, 52 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 267 (2003). 
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tering socially desirable human action by establishing structural prin-
ciples that induce individuals to take into account private information 
and subjective values and truthfully reflect such information and val-
ues in their behavioral choices. Functional law and economics repre-
sents a mode of analysis that bridges (and, in some sense, improves 
upon) both the positive and normative schools of thought in law and 
economics. Through its ex ante perspective, the functional school fo-
cuses on mechanism design issues to explain the origins of law, cap-
turing both the efficiency and non-efficiency perspectives of the other 
two schools. 
